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Abstract
This paper studies discriminatory and non-discriminatory pricing when firms’ customers
have heterogeneous switching costs and market shares are asymmetric. This setting encom-
passes many markets in which established firms are challenged by disruptive entrants and
have yet come under regulatory scrutiny. We identify circumstances under which regulatory
interventions to protect “back-book” customers from exploitation are counterproductive. And
we show how most-favoured customer clauses can be discriminatory and would benefit firms,
but firms do not have an incentive to implement them unilaterally.
JEL classification: L11, L13, D4
Keywords: switching costs, price discrimination, uniform pricing, most-favoured cus-
tomer clauses, competition
1 Introduction
The presence of sticky, or “unengaged”, consumers who find it costly to choose to switch
from their current service provider is arguably one of the most intractable issues faced
by competition authorities [Authority for Consumers and Markets, 2014, Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission, 2017, European Commission, 2016, Finan-
cial Conduct Authority, 2015, Hortac¸su et al., 2017, OECD, 2017]. Such loyal customers,
often labelled a provider’s “back-book”, are said to convey unfair competitive advantages to
∗This paper generalizes the ideas first presented in Siciliani and Beckert [2017]. We thank Mark
Armstrong, Yongmin Chen, Thomas Gehrig, Paul Grout, Ken Hori and John Thanassoulis for very valuable
comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to audiences at the EARIE 2017 and RES 2018 conferences.
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large oligopolistic incumbents because they are typically more profitable than “front-book”
customers who are more active, regularly shop around in search for a better deal and find it
less costly to switch [Productivity Commission, 2018].
In this paper, in a duopoly with asymmetric market shares we study discriminatory
pricing schemes that target customers with heterogeneous switching costs. We compare the
resulting outcomes with those under non-discriminatory prices. We thereby investigate how
market shares and the distribution of switching costs interact when firms consider which
pricing scheme they wish to adopt.
The kind of markets that form the backdrop to our analysis involve utilities such as
retail energy, basic telecom services and retail financial services such as current accounts.
They provide essential services that every consumer must purchase to satisfy basic needs. So
potential lock-in of consumers who find it costly to choose to switch and their exploitation
are significant policy concerns.
These markets are dynamic and have recently experienced entry by “challenger” firms.
Yet “challenger” firms typically face barriers to entry and expansion due to higher customer
acquisition costs and the risk that the make-up of their customer base is overexposed towards
customers with low switching costs and hence high propensity to switch [Authority for
Consumers and Markets, 2014, Financial Conduct Authority, 2015]. This gives rise to
asymmetric market shares, at least initially. The combined effect of potential lock-in of
a large portion of consumers and the initial asymmetry of market shares suggests potentially
very large consumer detriment [Competition and Markets Authority, 2016a,b, Hortac¸su et al.,
2017].
Compounding the issue of consumer inertia creating entry and expansion barriers, in-
cumbents can also recur to the use of behavioural-based price discrimination (BBPD) in
order to stifle the growth of “challenger” firms. One obvious form of BBPD is history-
base price discrimination (HBPD) whereby firms offer separate poaching prices to rivals’
customers, typically at a discount off the price paid by existing customers, and possibly to
the detriment of the retained customers [Financial Conduct Authority, 2017].1
A second, more subtle, form of BBPD is to exploit consumer inertia by launching a new
tariff that is available to both rivals’ and own customers, in the knowledge that only the
most active among the latter group will be able to take advantage of it.2 Therefore, this
second form of BBPD is akin to a retention strategy based on the use of most-favoured-nation
1For example, Competition and Markets Authority [2016a], para 8.232ff, finds evidence of price
discrimination between new start-ups and established businesses with respect to business current accounts.
2This configuration can be thought of as the result of consumers becoming unengaged due to confusion
and ensuing difficulty in choosing the best tariff from a vast number of complex alternatives, whereas active
consumers with low switching costs do better at identifying the cheapest tariff when shopping around.
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(MFN) or most-favoured-customer (MFC) clauses where existing customers face heteroge-
neous “hassle costs” to enforce their right by asking their current service provider to match
the lower price offered to other (potentially new) customers. Incidentally, this configuration
can also arise as a result of regulatory intervention aimed at not only neutralising the use of
HBPD by the incumbent (i.e., by imposing a profit sacrifice when poaching rivals’ customers),
but also protecting existing “back-book” customers by facilitating “internal switching” (i.e.,
upgrading to a better tariff). We label this configuration HBPD with “leakage”[Financial
Conduct Authority, 2016, OECD, 2016].
This paper studies pricing models with random heterogeneous switching costs that differ
across duopolistic firms with asymmetric market shares. In doing so, the paper generalizes
and extends the analysis of “mature markets” with common uniformly distributed switching
costs in Chen [1997]. As pointed out by Chen [1997], markets with asymmetric, history-
based market shares may be of interest in their own right, e.g. to study new commercial
strategies that were not anticipated at the inception of the market. This setting is also
of interest because the kind of “switching markets” we are interested in, at least at the
point of entry of a challenger, exhibit asymmetries, not only in terms of market shares, but
also with respect to average switching costs as they relate to “back-book” and “front-book”
customers. Hence, they are often subject to policy interventions such as mandated removals
of arbitrage restrictions that aim at overcoming the risk of such asymmetries becoming
entrenched [Financial Conduct Authority, 2015, 2016].
In general, though, regulatory intervention aimed at protecting “back-book” customers
is fraught with difficulties to the extent that active customers benefit from lower prices
thanks to firms poaching.3 We characterise the conditions under which “locked-in” prices
charged to “back-book” customers under BBPD are lower than those they would face under
uniform pricing as result of policy interventions aimed at protecting unengaged customers
from exploitation.
Our analysis provides other novel insights. We show that, with heterogeneous switching
costs across firms with asymmetric market shares, there are circumstances in which a chal-
lenger firm with small market share and a customer base with relatively low switching costs
will prefer non-discriminatory pricing, even if faced with a larger incumbent with a customer
base with relatively high switching costs. Hence, there is no prisonners’ dilemma, in contrast
to the Hotelling-based model of Thisse and Vives [1988].
Furthermore, our model of HBPD with leakage adds a new perspective on MFCs. Unlike
3For example, OECD [2016], para. 136, report that the UK energy regulator imposed a non-discrimination
requirement on energy firms. However, after receiving criticism the CMA identified this as softening
competition and has therefore recommended its removal.
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in Besanko and Lyon [1993], where MFCs apply to all customers indiscriminately and thus
act as a non-discrimination commitment device, in our setting the use of MFCs amounts
to a form of third-degree price discrimination. Here we find a different type of prisoners’
dilemma, whereby both firms would be better off under the common use of MFCs but none
of them has a unilateral incentive to adopt MFCs. In particular, an incumbent with high
market shares and relatively high switching costs can anticipate that the smaller rival has
strong incentives not to reciprocate but stick to the use of vanilla HBPD. Therefore, an
asymmetric regulatory intervention aimed at imposing leakage only on the large incumbent
would tend to favour the challenger firm.
Our framework is related to Gehrig et al. [2012] who study the welfare implications of
HBPD under asymmetric market shares. The authors find that even when firms can price
discriminate between new and current customers, poaching might not take place if switching
costs are sufficiently high. Moreover, where market shares are particularly skewed, the
erosion of the larger firm’s customer base is larger than under uniform pricing. Indeed, for
very asymmetric inherited market shares the larger firm may not offer a poaching offer given
that it would be too costly to attract marginal customers that are close to the previous cut-
off point, but very far from the opposite extreme where the dominant firm is located. This
is because, similar to Thisse and Vives [1988], the authors also include brand preferences
under a linear Hotelling model so that it is too expensive for the larger firm to pre-empt
poaching of its least loyal customers.
We believe that the inclusion of heterogeneous brand preferences to model competition
in “switching markets” is problematic, however. In the Hotelling linear duopoly model of
product differentiation and horizontal brand preferences, loyal customers are the ones paying
the lowest ’delivered’ price, inclusive of the ’transport’ cost due to distance in product space;
marginal consumers that firms compete over are located farther away from either firm and
end-up paying a higher ’delivered’ price. In contrast to this, the main competition concern
raised in the context of consumer disengagement is that loyal “back-book” customers - those
less likely to switch - arguably are the ones being exploited by their current provider and
pay higher prices, compared to marginal, “front-book” customers. Indeed, a corollary of
customer inertia due to the lack of engagement is, at least anecdotally, that customers fail
to see that there are benefits from switching because they are under the impression that
competing firms are undifferentiated.
Another feature of the Hotelling model of horizontal differentiation that does not fit the
stylised facts is that a firm with the smaller market share is protected from the risk of further
customer “poaching” thanks to the fact that the make-up of its customer base is dominated
by very loyal customers who face very high “transport” costs. This is in contrast to the view
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that “challenger” firms, which start by definition with very small market shares, might be
over-exposed to incumbents’ “front-book” customers with low switching costs.
Accordingly, our approach is to directly models heterogeneous switching costs, rather
than brand preferences, in a spatial linear model. Moreover, in addition to Gehrig et al.
[2012] we also analyse unilateral incentives to adopt BBPD. Our framework is closest to
Shaffer and Zhang [2000] who allow for heterogenous switching costs, distributed according
to a uniform distribution with common minima equal to zero, and asymmetric baseline
market shares. However, we do not impose restrictions on the type of distribution and
minima and also study a third pricing regime, MFCs, besides HBPD and UP.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details our assumptions and discusses HBPD.
Section 3 contrasts our results on HBPD with uniform pricing. Section 4 discusses MFCs
and HBPD with leakage. And Section 5 concludes.
2 History-Based Price Discrimination
Suppose customers are spread uniformly on the unit interval, and two firms, A and B, are
located at x0, so that A’s market share is x0 ∈ (0, 1) and B’s market share is 1−x0. Market
shares are taken as predetermined, but – as in Chen [1997] – it turns out that they do not
matter when prices are not uniform, except in cases when the heterogeneity of customer
switching costs itself is tied to market shares.
Suppose customers of firm A have switching costs sA that are distributed with CDF
ΦA(s) for s ∈ SA ⊆ R+, and customers of firm B have switching costs sB with CDF ΦB(s),
s ∈ SB ⊆ R+. This allows for heterogeneity of the distribution of switching costs of the two
firms’ customer bases, except when S = SA = SB and ΦA(s) = ΦB(s) for all s ∈ S. Suppose
also that both CDFs are continuously differentiable so that their pdfs φA(s) and φB(s) exist.
As in Chen [1997], let qij denote the levels of historic demand at firm j that currently
accrues at firm i, with i, j ∈ {A,B}. So when i 6= j, this is the demand firm j loses when
firm i poaches firm j’s customers. Let pi denote firm i’s locked-in price, and pip firm i’s
poaching price, which can be thought of as pi net of an inducement mi that i offers to j’s
customers who switch to i. We assume throughout that consumers’ valuations exceed prices.
Then, given (pA, pB,ma,mB), firm A’s marginal customer has switching costs σA = pA−
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pB +mB, and firm B’s marginal customer has σB = pB − pA +mA. Therefore,
qAA = x0Pr (sA ≥ σa) = x0 (1− ΦA (σA))
qBA = x0ΦA(σA)
qBB = (1− x0) (1− ΦB (σB))
qAB = (1− x0)ΦB(σB).
Assume firms have the same marginal cost c. Then, the firms’ profits are given by
piA(pA,mA; pB,mB) = (pA − c)x0 (1− ΦA (σA)) + (pA − c−mA)(1− x0)ΦB(σB)
piB(pB,mB; pA,mA) = (pB − c)(1− x0) (1− ΦB (σB)) + (pB − c−mB)xoΦA(σA).
The firms’ profit maximization problems yield the following first-order conditions,4
p∗A − c =
1− ΦA(σ∗A)
φA(σ∗A)
p∗B − c =
1− ΦB(σ∗B)
φB(σ∗B)
p∗A − c−m∗A =
ΦB(σ
∗
B)
φB(σ∗B)
p∗B − c−m∗B =
ΦA(σ
∗
A)
φA(σ∗A)
,
where p∗i and m
∗
i denote firm i’s optimal price and discount, and σ
∗
i = p
∗
i − p∗j + m∗j , i, j ∈
{A,B} and i 6= j. As in Chen [1997], the initial market shares x0 and 1− x0 do not matter
for the firms’ optimal strategy – unless the distributions of the customers’ switching costs
themselves are functions of the initial market shares.5
The first-order conditions permit some initial insights into per-unit margins. They show
that a firm’s per-unit margin on retained customers is larger (smaller) than the per-unit
margin of its rival on its poached customers if the marginal customer’s switching cost is
below (above) the median switching costs of its customer base. By the definition of σA and
4The derivation uses the fact that the first-order conditions with respect to mA and mB eliminate the
derivative of the second summand in piA and piB with respect to pA and pB , respectively.
5This could arise, for example, as a consequence of network effects. See, for example, the discussion in
Farrell and Klemperer [2007].
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σB however, the first-order conditions imply
σ∗A =
1− 2ΦA(σ∗A)
φA(σ∗A)
σ∗B =
1− 2ΦB(σ∗B)
φB(σ∗B)
,
and so in order for σ∗A ≥ 0 and σ∗B ≥ 0, it needs to be the case that both are no larger than
the median of the respective switching cost distributions. Hence, the per-unit margin earned
on retained customers exceeds the one earned by the rival on the firm’s poached customers.
Defining the elasticity of firm j’s demand qij accruing to firm i with respect to firm i’s
price charged to firm j’s customers by qij ,pji(σj), the first-order conditions imply
p∗A − c
p∗A
= − 1
qAA,pA(σ
∗
A)
p∗B − c
p∗B
= − 1
qBB ,pB(σ
∗
B)
p∗A − c−m∗A
p∗A −m∗A
=
1
qAB ,pA−mA(σ
∗
B)
p∗B − c−m∗B
p∗B −m∗B
=
1
qBA,pB−mB(σ
∗
A)
.
So the relative profit margins are seen to be inversely proportional to the own and cross
price elasticities of the respective firm level demands for the marginal customers. This
is noteworthy because it shows that any discount offered to specific groups of customers
depends on the magnitude of the firm’s own price elasticity of demand relative to the cross
price elasticity of its rival’s lost demand, for the respective marginal customers in equilibrium.
In order to characterize the solution further, we make the following
Assumption 1: (Monotone Likelihood Ratio, MLR)
φA(s)
φB(s)
≥ φA(t)
φB(t)
∀s ≥ t; s ∈ SA, t ∈ SB.
The MLR assumption has been discussed and used widely in microeconomic theory [Athey,
2002, Lebrun, 1998, Maskin and Riley, 2000].
The MLR assumption implies that the distribution of firm A’s customers’ switching
costs ΦA first-order stochastically dominates that of firm B’s customers’ switching costs,
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i.e. ΦA(s) ≤ ΦB(s) for all s ∈ SA ∪ SB.6 It also implies that E[sA] ≥ E[sB].7 So firm A’s
customers are more likely to have higher switching costs than firm B’s, and their average
switching costs are also higher. That suggests that firm A’s customers are more likely to be
locked-in than firm B’s.
Furthermore, the MLR assumption implies the hazard rate (H) inequality:8
φB(s)
1− ΦB(s) ≥
φA(s)
1− ΦA(s) ∀s ∈ SA ∪ SB.
This inequality implies that, for any s, firm A’s demand exhibits a lower own-price elasticity
than firm B’s demand.
Similarly, the MLR assumption implies the reverse hazard rate (RH) inequality:
φA(s)
ΦA(s)
≥ φB(s)
ΦB(s)
∀s ∈ SA ∪ SB.
This inequality, in turn, implies that, for any s, firm A’s demand lost to firm B exhibits a
higher cross-price elasticity than firm B’s demand lost to firm A.
Consider two further assumptions.
Assumption 2: The hazard rates are weakly increasing, i.e.
φi(s)
1− Φi(s) ≤
φi(t)
1− Φi(t) ∀s ≤ t; s, t ∈ Si, i = A,B.
This assumptions holds for the uniform distribution and the Weibull distribution with
shape parameter greater than or equal to unity.9 It implies that the firms’ own-price
elasticities are weakly increasing.
Assumption 3: The reverse hazard rates are weakly decreasing, i.e.
φi(s)
Φi(s)
≥ φi(t)
Φi(t)
∀s ≤ t; s, t ∈ Si, i = A,B.
This assumption holds whenever the pdf is bounded. This assumption does not imply
that the cross-price elasticities of the firm’s lost demand are monotonic, however.
Using these assumptions, we can obtain the following results.
6This follows from rearranging, integrating w.r.t. t over SA ∪ SB and then integrating up to s. It is
obvious if supSB ≤ inf SA.
7This follows from φB(t)sφA(s) ≥ φA(t)sφB(s), integrating w.r.t. s and t over SA ∪ SB .
8This follows from rearranging and integrating w.r.t. t up from s.
9The Weibull CDF is given by F (s) = 1 − exp(−γsα), for s ∈ R and scale parameter γ > 0 and shape
parameter α > 0; α = 1 yields the exponential CDF. Its hazard rate is weakly increasing for α ≥ 1 and
decreasing for α < 1.
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Lemma 2.1: Under Assumptions 1-3, σ∗A ≥ σ∗B.
Proof: Assumption 1 implies H and RH. Suppose the opposite were true, i.e. σA < σB.
Then, by RH and Assumption 3, for σ∗A < s < σ
∗
B,
ΦA(σ
∗
A)
φA(σ∗A)
≤ ΦA(s)
φA(s)
≤ ΦB(s)
φB(s)
≤ ΦB(σ
∗
B)
φB(σ∗B)
,
and so the last two first-order conditions imply p∗B−m∗B ≤ p∗A−m∗A. H and Assumption
2 imply,
1− ΦB(σ∗B)
φB(σ∗B)
≤ 1− ΦB(s)
φB(s)
≤ 1− ΦA(s)
φA(s)
≤ 1− ΦA(σ
∗
A)
φA(σ∗A)
,
and the first two first-order conditions in turn imply p∗B ≤ p∗A. Therefore, the two
inequalities imply σ∗B = p
∗
B − p∗A +m∗A ≤ p∗A − p∗B +m∗B = σ∗A, a contradiction. 
The Lemma has the interpretation that firm A’s marginal customer that firm B induces
to switch has a higher switching cost than firm B’s marginal customer.
Under the current assumptions, no more can be said about the relationship between σ∗A
and σ∗B. Suppose, however,
Assumption 4: The switching costs of firm A’s customers, sA, are a linear transforma-
tion of the switching costs of firm B’s customers, i.e. sA = asB for some a > 1.
Then, we have
Lemma 2.2: Under Assumption 4, σ∗A = aσ
∗
B, and ΦA(σ
∗
A) = ΦB(σ
∗
B).
Proof: Under Assumption 4, for all s in the SA, ΦA(s) = ΦB( 1as) and φA(s) = φB( 1as) 1a .
Therefore, the first-order conditions imply
σ∗A =
1− 2ΦA(σ∗A)
φA(σ∗A)
=
1− 2ΦB( 1aσ∗A)
φB(
1
a
σ∗A)
1
a
,
or
1
a
σ∗A =
1− 2ΦB( 1aσ∗A)
φB(
1
a
σ∗A)
,
i.e. σ∗B =
1
a
σ∗A. 
Note that Assumption 4 implies first-order stochastic dominance, but not necessarily
monotone likelihood ratio.10
The preceding Lemmas are useful in order to establish the following
10It does imply MLR in the case of the exponential distribution, for example.
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Proposition 2.1: Under Assumption 4, p∗B ≤ p∗A, and m∗B ≤ m∗A.
Proof: From σ∗A ≥ σ∗B by the preceding Lemma, it follows that 2(p∗A−p∗B) ≥ m∗A−m∗B.
So it is sufficient to prove that m∗A ≥ m∗B. From the first-order conditions,
m∗A −m∗B =
1
φA(σ∗A)
− 1
φB(σ∗B)
.
Lemma 2.2 implies from the first-order conditions that σ∗AφA(σ
∗
A) = σ
∗
BφB(σ
∗
B), where
σ∗A > σ
∗
B. Hence φA(σ
∗
A) ≤ φB(σ∗B). 
The preceding result shows that, with heterogeneous switching costs, the firm with the
more locked-in customer base charges a higher price. At the same time, it must offer a larger
discount to its price in order to induce its rival’s customer to switch because these customers
tend to have lower switching costs.
The model by Chen [1997], for the second period in a two-period game with payments
for customers to switch, is a special case of this general framework, with φA(s) = φB(s) =
1
θ
1{s∈[0,θ]}, θ > 0.
3 Uniform Pricing
It is interesting to compare the history-based price discrimination outcome of Proposition
2.1 with a situation in which the firms charge uniform prices. In this situation, either some
of firm A’s customer switch – if firm A’s uniform price puA exceeds firm B’s uniform price p
u
B
–, or some of firm B’s customers switch, but not both.
Consider the first of these two cases, with firm A’s marginal customer’s switching cost
σuA = p
u
A − puB > 0. Assume henceforth that 0 = min{s : s ∈ SA} = min{s : s ∈ SB}. The
firms’ demands are then
quA = x0 (1− ΦA(σuA))
quB = 1− x0 + x0ΦA(σuA).
Clearly, only the distribution of switching costs of firm A’s customers who are at risk of
switching matters in this case. The distribution of firm B’s customers’ switching cost is
immaterial.
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The firms’ profits are
piuA(p
u
A, p
u
B) = (pA − c)x0 (1− ΦA(σuA))
piuB(p
u
A, p
u
B) = (pB − c) (1− x0 + x0ΦA(σuA)) ,
and the first-order conditions for the firms’ profit maximization problems yield
p∗uA − c =
1− ΦA(σ∗uA )
φA(σ∗uA )
p∗uB − c =
1− x0 + x0ΦA(σ∗uA )
x0φA(σ∗uA )
.
Therefore,
σ∗uA = p
∗u
A − p∗uB
=
2x0 (1− ΦA(σ∗uA ))− 1
x0φA(σ∗uA )
.
The final equation shows that x0 ≥ 12 is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium
with p∗uA > p
∗u
B to exist.
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The expression for σ∗uA also shows that σ
∗u
A and hence the optimal uniform prices depend
on x0. In particular, if ΦA has a relatively high probability mass on low values of sA, then σ
∗u
A
tends to be small, and the more so that the closer x0 is to
1
2
. This, in turn, means that firm
B’s price is not much lower than firm A’s price - regardless of how skewed the distribution
of switching costs of firm B’s customers is towards high or low values.12 While the situation
of ΦA (and / or ΦB) having high probability mass on sets of low values of switching costs
may appear inconsistent with the notion of a mature market, such situations may arise as
a consequence of a regulatory intervention that is aimed at lowering the switching costs of
larger portions of consumers.
Also, in that case, firm B may be better off employing a price-discrimination strategy
because it would allow it to target and segment consumers with different switching costs in
its own customer base. It is easy to construct examples that exhibit that feature.
Example: Suppose Φi(s) = 1− exp(−γisα), i = A,B, with γA = 4, γB = 3, α = 1 (i.e.
exponential) and x0 = 0.55.
13 Then, p∗A =
1
4
, p∗B =
1
3
, m∗A = 0.0759, m
∗
B = 0.2159, and
piA = 0.1107 and piB = 0.1196; while p
∗u
A =
1
4
and p∗uB = 0.2342, and pi
u
A = 0.1291 and
11Note that σuA = 0 implies that the righthand side is strictly positive for x0 > 0, so that by continuity
σ∗uA > 0. Again, Chen [1997] provides a special case of this result.
12This is not an issue in models like Chen [1997] that assume homogeneous switching costs.
13Note that in this example, ΦB first-order stochastically dominates ΦA.
11
piuB = 0.1133. So firm B would be better off if it could price discriminate, while the
opposite is true for firm A.
For comparison, if γA = 3 and γB = 4, i.e. ΦA first-order stochastically dominates
ΦB, then p
∗u
A =
1
3
and p∗uB = 0.3123, with profits pi
u
A = 0.1721 and pi
u
B = 0.1510; with
history-based price discrimination, p∗A =
1
3
, p∗B =
1
4
,m∗A = 0.2077 and m
∗
B = 0.0896,
and profits piA = 0.1313 and piB = 0.1041. So in this case, both firms would be better
off with uniform pricing.
The first part of the example shows that with heterogeneous switching costs and asymmet-
ric historic market shares, in the terminology of Belleflamme and Peitz [2010] the competition
and surplus extraction effects may operate differently for the two firms. And that may lead
them to prefer different pricing strategies.
The second part of the example shows that there are circumstances in which both
firms’ uniform prices exceed those under HBPD, and both firms earn higher profits with
uniform prices than with discriminatory prices. This is consistent with the finding that price
discrimination under oligopoly can intensify pricing rivalry when competing firms exhibit
best-response asymmetry in that they hold opposing views as to which consumers are strong
and which are instead weak [Armstrong, 2006]. It also illustrates the following more general
result.
Proposition 3.1: Under Assumptions 1-3, p∗uA ≥ p∗A and p∗uB ≥ p∗B.
Proof: It is sufficient to prove that σ∗uA ≤ σ∗A which implies, by the first-order conditions
for firm A and Assumption 2, that p∗uA ≥ p∗A. This, together with σ∗A > σ∗B > 0 under
HBPD, as shown in Lemma 2.1, by Assumption 2 implies also p∗uB ≥ p∗B.14
Suppose to the contrary that σ∗uA > σ
∗
A. Then, p
∗u
A ≤ p∗A by the first-order conditions
and Assumption 2. This ranking of prices of firm A, together with the supposition,
implies also that p∗uB ≤ p∗B −m∗B.15 Therefore, p∗uB − c ≤ p∗B − c−m∗B, and hence
1− x0 + x0ΦA(σ∗uA )
x0φA(σ∗uA )
≤ ΦA(σ
∗
A)
φA(σ∗)
.
Notice that x0 = 1 implies σ
∗u
A = σ
∗
A. Since the lefthand side of the inequality is
decreasing in x0, Assumption A3 implies that σ
∗u
A < σ
∗
A for
1
2
< x0 < 1, a contradiction
to the supposition. 
14The situation of uniform prices is akin to σ∗B = 0, i.e. none of firm B’s customers switch. Assumption 2
then implies that p∗B for σ
∗
B > 0 is lower than the corresponding price if σB were zero.
15This is because, under the supposition, p∗A − p∗uA > p∗uA − p∗uB = σ∗uA > σ∗A = p∗A − p∗B +m∗B .
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The Proposition shows that, if the large, established firm has a customer base that finds
it relatively more costly to switch, compared to the challenger firm, then uniform prices are
higher than prices for locked-in customers under HBPD. This result is of policy relevance as
it is often argued that non-discriminatory interventions are aimed at protecting unengaged
customers from exploitation. Our result shows that there exist circumstances in which such
interventions would harm locked-in customers.
Note that our argument implies that, while σ∗uA ≤ σ∗A, for x0 high enough σ∗uA ≥ σ∗A−σ∗B.
So for high initial market share x0, firm A looses more market share under uniform prices
than under HBPD. This result contrasts with Result 2 in Gehrig et al. [2011] that shows that
the market share of the dominant firm is larger under uniform pricing than under HBPD,
because under the linear structure of their Hotelling framework the dominant firm finds it
very costly to poach distant customers of the rival firm, thereby insulating the smaller firm
from poaching by its dominant rival.
Discussion: Unilateral Incentives
We next examine whether a firm has an incentive to poach its rival’s customers by
unilateral price discrimination. We focus on poaching by the smaller “challenger” firm.
Let pLB denote firm B’s price for locked-in customers, mB any discount offered to firm
A’s customers, and puA firm A’s uniform price. Notice first that it must be the case that
pLB −mb ≤ puA ≤ pLB.
The reason is that, if pLB − mB > puA, none of firm A’s customers would switch. And if
pLB < p
u
A, all of firm A’s customers who switch to B would pay the lower poaching price
pBL −mB and the remaining customers of firm B could be charged a higher price.
With these prices, the two firms’ marginal customers are
σA = p
u
A − pLB +mB
σB = p
L
B − pUA,
and so mB = σ
B − σA > 0.
On the basis of these prices and marginal customers, the firms’ profits are
piA = (p
u
A − c) [x0(1− ΦA(σA)) + (1− x0)ΦB(σB)]
piB = (p
L
B − c)(1− x0)(1− ΦB(σB) + (pLB − c−mB)x0ΦA(σA).
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The first-order conditions of the firms’ profit maximization problems yield
puA − c =
x0(1− ΦA(σ)) + (1− x0)ΦB(σB)
x0φa(σA) + (1− x0)φB(σB)
pLB − c =
1− ΦB(σB)
φB(σB)
pLB − c−mB =
ΦA(σA)
φA(σA)
.
Since σB > σA, assumptions A1 and A2 imply
1−ΦB(σB)
φB(σB)
≤ 1−ΦA(σA)
φA(σA)
. Therefore, the first
two first-order conditions imply that, in order to satisfy puA < p
L
B, firm A’s market share
must not be too high.
Recall that in the case of uniform pricing, firm B sets its price with a view towards the
marginal customer of firm A, as seen in the previous section. The distribution of of its own
customers’ switching costs is immaterial.
With unilateral price discrimination, however, because of the wedge between pLB and
pLB−mB that brackets firm A’s price puA, some of firm B’s customers switch to firm A, unlike
in the case of uniform pricing. Therefore, firm B sets its locked-in price pLB with a view to
its marginal customer σB > 0. To defend its turf, firm B must lower its price p
L
B below p
u
B;
the latter was only optimal when firm B’s customers were not at risk of switching.
Under assumption A1 – whereby firm A’s customers are more likely to have high switching
costs than firm B’s –, the gain in market share by firm B from poaching is small, relative to
the loss of market share due to some of its customers switching to firm A, because σB > σA.
So firm B’s prices are lower than its uniform price puB, and its market share is no larger than
with uniform pricing, so its profits must be lower. In conclusion, firm B does not have an
incentive to unilaterally price discriminate.
This outcome differs from results like in Thisse and Vives [1988] where price-discrimination
is a dominant strategy for both firms and leads to an outcome that is unambiguously
dominated by that resulting from uniform pricing.16
Example: (continued) For the case γA = 3 and γB = 4, with x0 = 0.55, the prices are
given by puA = 0.1915, p
L
B =
1
4
and mB = 0.1477. These yield profits piA = 0.0986 and
piB = 0.1022.
16Unlike in Thisse and Vives [1988], consumer heterogeneity is due to different levels of switching costs,
which entails that firms cannot prevent arbitrage, in that consumers with low switching costs cannot
be prevented from choosing a tariff aimed at marginal consumers with relatively higher switching costs.
Whereas, Thisse and Vives [1988] model consumer heterogeneity based on different levels of transport costs
(i.e., as being geographically differentiated), thus allowing firms to set different prices for different levels of
transport costs.
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4 Leakage (MFCs)
By leakage we mean that a firm offers its inducement mLj , j = A,B, aimed at its rival’s
customers as in section 2, to its own customers as well. This can be viewed as a most-
favoured customer clause (MFC).17
Suppose internal switching is only a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) as costly as external switching.
In this setting, both firms offer a poaching price, below their respective regular price. Some
customers of both firms switch internally to the sweetened tariff (internal switcher), and
some stay (are locked in) at the regular price. External switching is only in one direction,
to the firm with the lower poaching price.18
Denote the level of switching costs of the marginal internal switcher by σij, and the
switching costs of the marginal external switcher by σej , j = A,B. Then, if p
L
j denotes the
price charged to locked-in customers,
pLj = p
L
j −mLj + ασij
pLj −mLj + ασej = pLk −mLk + σej , j, k = A,B; j 6= k.
Therefore,
σij =
mLj
α
σej =
{
pLj −pLk−(mLj −mLk )
1−α if p
L
j − pLk − (mLj −mLk ) > 0
0 o.w.
, j, k = A,B; j 6= k.
Lemma 4.1: σij > σ
e
j , j = A,B.
Proof: Suppose, to the contrary, that σij < σ
e
j . Then, a customer of firm j with s such
that σij < s < σ
e
j , switches externally, but not internally, iff
pLk −mLk + s < pjL −mLj + αs,
or iff
(1− α)s < pLj − pLk − (mLj −mLk ).
A customer of firm j with s′ < σij switches internally, but not externally, iff
pLk −mLk + s′ > pjL −mLj + αs′,
17See Akman and Hviid [2006] for a discussion of MFCs from the perspective of competition law.
18This is shown in Lemma 4.2 below.
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or iff
(1− α)s′ > pLj − pLk − (mLj −mLk ).
But then, s′ > s, a contradiction. 
Lemma 4.2: σ∗eA > 0 (and σ
∗e
B = 0) if, and only if, x0 ≥ 12 .
Proof: Suppose external switching is from A to B and σeA > 0. Then,
piLA = x0(p
L
A − c) (1− ΦA(σeA))−mLAx0
(
ΦA(σ
i
A)− ΦA(σeA)
)
piLB = (1− x0)(pLB − c)−mLB(1− x0)ΦB
(
σiB
)
+ x0(p
L
B − c−mLB)ΦA (σeA) .
The first-order conditions for the firms’ profit maximization problem yield
σ∗iA =
m∗LA
α
=
1− ΦA(σ∗iA )
φA(σ∗iA )
σ∗iB =
m∗LB
α
=
1− ΦB(σ∗iB )
φB(σ∗iB )
p∗LA − c−m∗LA
1− α =
1− ΦA(σ∗eA )
φA(σ∗eA )
p∗LB − c−m∗LB
1− α =
1− x0 + x0ΦA(σ∗eA )
x0φA(σ∗eA )
.
Therefore,
σ∗eA =
p∗LA − c−m∗LA
1− α −
p∗LB − c−m∗LB
1− α
=
2x0 (1− ΦA(σ∗eA ))− 1
x0φa(σ∗eA )
,
which shows that σeA > 0 if, and only if, x0 ≥ 12 . 
Corollary 4.1: σ∗eA = σ
∗u
A .
This corollary to Lemma 4.2 follows immediately from the last equality in the proof of
the preceding lemma. It shows that firm A’s marginal customer who is indifferent between
staying with A and externally switching to firm B is the same as in the case of uniform
pricing.
Proposition 4.1: Given x0 >
1
2
and Assumptions 1-3, m∗LA ≥ m∗LB and p∗LA ≥ p∗LB .
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Proof: Assumptions 1-3 imply that the first two first-order conditions of the firms’
profit maximization problem imply σ∗iA ≥ σ∗iB , and hence m∗LA ≥ m∗LB . Lemma 3 then
implies that p∗LA − p∗LB ≥ 0. 
Example: (continued) Suppose again that γA = 4 and γB = 3, and let α = 0.4. Then,
m∗LA = 0.1000, m
∗L
B = 0.1333, p
∗L
A =
1
4
and p∗LB = 0.2739. So locked-in prices are no
less than uniform prices. However, with x0 = 0.55, this yields profits pi
L
A = 0.0977 and
piLB = 0.0900. So, compared to the outcome with uniform pricing and with history-
based price discrimination, both firms are worse off.
In the case of γA = 4 and γB = 3, again with α = 0.4 and x0 = 0.55, m
∗L
A = 0.1333,
m∗LB = 0.1, p
∗
A =
1
3
and p∗LB = 0.2874, with profits pi
L
A = 0.1303 and pi
L
B = 0.1072. So
compared to history-based price discrimination, firm A is less profitable and firm B is
more profitable.
If internal switching is less costly, then in this example MFCs become more profitable
for both firms: With γA = 4, γB = 3 and α = 0.05, m
∗L
A = 0.0167, m
∗L
B = 0.0125,
p∗LA =
1
3
and p∗LB = 0.3092, with profits pi
L
A = 0.1669 and pi
L
B = 0.1455. These are still
less than those under uniform pricing, however. Leakage neutralises the toughening
effect that the use of history-based price discrimination has on pricing rivalry, thanks
to the fact that firms can use their poaching price as a defensive tool.
The example shows that, whether or not MFCs are profitable, relative to history-based
price discrimination without leakage, depends on the relative distribution of switching costs
between the two firms and the level of the cost of internal switching.
Discussion: Unilateral Incentives
Does either firm have an incentive to unilaterally impose an MFC (i.e. to allow leakage),
given its rival does not? As the example shows, this question is only really relevant when the
costs of internal switching are sufficiently low and when the distribution of switching costs
disadvantages the larger firm.
In this case, the larger, established firm’s customers are at relatively higher risk of
switching, and hence the larger firm would want to consider an MFC as a defense. But that
would mean that it will stem some of the outflow of customers to the challenger firm, while at
the same time applying its lower poaching price to a large fraction of its remaining customer
base. As α decreases, this fraction of the established firm’s customer base increases, while
the retention of marginal customers is eroded due to lower poaching prices of the challenger
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firm. So the established firm will earn less on a large fraction of its customer base and hence
does not have an incentive to offer an MFC unilaterally.
To the best of our knowledge there is no extant economic literature researching the
incentive to use MFCs where customers face heterogeneous ‘hassle’ costs to claim for com-
pensation, so that it translates into a form of second-degree price discrimination. Besanko
and Lyon [1993] analyse firms’ incentives to adopt MFCs where consumers are partitioned
between “non shoppers”, who never consider switching, and “shoppers”, who have no brand
preference. However, the MFC applies to every customer indiscriminately. Therefore, the
use of an MFC amounts to a non-discrimination commitment device. In our model this cor-
responds to a setting under uniform pricing where α is equal to zero. The authors show that
there can be configurations where firms have a unilateral incentive to use contemporaneous
MFCs. They also show that the use of contemporaneous MFCs has a “band-wagon effect”
whereby the more firms that adopt the practice in question, the more compelling it is for
remaining firms to follow suit. Although our results are consistent with that effect, albeit
only for a limited set of parameters, we find that the firms lack the incentives to trigger it
in the first place.
On the one hand, the comparative analysis presented above suggests that the imposition
of measures intended to encourage internal switching by regulators may well be detrimental
to consumers, unless market shares are sufficiently skewed and/or the relative inconvenience
of external switching is not too high. On the other hand, these results also suggest that firms
might strategically react to the imposition of “leakage” by improving the relative convenience
of their internal switching.
As a corollary, an asymmetric regulatory intervention whereby the imposition of “leakage”
is solely directed at the larger firm can materially increase the smaller rival’s profit, in
particular for low values of α, primarily at the expense of its locked-in customers.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies discriminatory and uniform pricing in asymmetric oligopolistic markets
where firms’ customers have heterogeneous switching costs. We identify circumstances under
which price-discrimination can be beneficial for consumers, compared to uniform prices. We
also show that the imposition of MFCs, or price discrimination with leakage, might dissipate
much of these benefits when internal switching is significantly more convenient than external
switching to a rival firm. And we show that, the profitability of price discrimination with
and without leakage notwithstanding, firms typically lack the incentive to unilaterally impose
discriminatory prices.
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Our results are policy relevant. We offer a new perspective on MFCs. We explain that
MFCs can act as a discriminatory device, even if they are ex ante offered indiscriminately.
Our results are also relevant for regulatory interventions aimed at stemming or neutraliz-
ing possible exploitation of relatively “unengaged” back-book customers. Such interventions
typically endorse uniform prices. We show that there are circumstances where uniform
prices may well be higher for all customers and where, consequently, such interventions are
counterproductive.
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